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 ABSTRACT 
 
Firms conduct R&D continuously to develop new products and increase efficiency through 
cost-reductions. Due to knowledge spillovers, the private firms are not incentivized to conduct 
enough research from the social standpoint. There exist three main types of public policies to 
incentivize R&D: taxes and subsidies, intellectual property rights and R&D cooperation. This 
thesis a literature review that applies the famous d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model and related 
economic studies to show that R&D cooperation in research joint ventures helps to not only 
increase the incentives to research by internalizing the spillover externalities but also eliminate 
excessive duplication in research, increase efficient knowledge sharing, pool risks and maintain 
continuity in building up the national competitiveness. Other R&D policies may fix the biased 
incentives but fail to bring about these additional benefits. Even though R&D cooperation is 
proven to be a beneficial public policy both in theory and with successful real-life ventures, 
potential threats exists and special scrutinizing must be conducted to prevent collusion and 
increased monopoly power in the product market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When a private firm produces new knowledge in its research facilities, the new information is 
used inside the firm to develop new products or produce the current ones more efficiently (Katz 
& Ordover, 1990). What might be left unobserved without the help of economic theories is that 
part of this knowledge might transfer to surrounding rival firms even though no official 
exchange is made. This economic phenomenon is called a knowledge spillover. (d'Aspremont 
& Jacquemin, 1988).  
 
Knowledge spillovers are positive externalities of knowledge production because they benefit 
the whole society by eliminating duplicative efforts and inducing more productive innovation 
activities (Katz & Ordover, 1990). However, this means that individual firms cannot fully 
restrict competing firms from taking advantage of the research results to develop new products 
or enhance their efficiency (Choi, 1993). This inability to appropriate the benefits of R&D 
results lowers firms’ motives to conduct own research (Suzumura, 1992). In general, private 
R&D incentives are fundamentally biased from the socially optimal ones because individual 
firms maximize profits and ignore the welfare externalities (Katz & Ordover, 1990).  
 
While the biased private incentives are widely recognized in economic studies dealing with 
R&D activities, there are also various public policies aiming to correct them. There exist three 
main types of policies: tax and subsidy policies, ex post cooperation policies including 
intellectual property rights such as patents and licenses, and ex ante cooperation policies 
allowing cooperative agreements between firms to share their costs and R&D outputs (Katz & 
Ordover, 1990). These R&D cooperation arrangements are generally called research joint 
ventures in economic studies. 
 
Discussion around R&D cooperation and innovation practices in general has been boosted by 
the years of decelerated growth after the financial crisis. The newest applauded concept is 
public-private partnerships (PPP) that are a form of research joint ventures. There exist several 
highly successful PPPs around the world such as a venture called DIMECC in Finland. (OECD, 
2017). Motivated by demonstrated success of research joint ventures, this thesis focuses on 
how R&D cooperation can enhance the firms’ motives to engage in R&D and the overall 
productivity of R&D in the presence of spillovers.  
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The results from various studies show that research joint ventures play a central role in fixing 
research incentives, increasing R&D levels and eliminating excessive duplication especially in 
industries with high spillovers and intense competition. These benefits are further intensified 
with the synergy benefits gained by information sharing and resource pooling. Additionally, 
research joint ventures allow risk pooling and continuity in research in the long-term. However, 
cooperation in the research joint ventures must be strictly limited to only research because 
cooperation in the production side might bring on collusion and monopoly power. 
 
The comparative analysis with other public policies shows that even though every policy can 
manage to fix the research incentives, subsidies and intellectual property rights fail to bring 
about the additional benefits for boosting R&D activities. In addition, the subsidies may inflict 
moral hazard and deadweight losses on other actors whereas the intellectual property rights 
induce efficiency losses by disseminating knowledge at socially too high prices. Most 
importantly, these alternative policies perform worse than R&D cooperation in motivating 
knowledge sharing and maintaining continuous research efforts that support competitiveness 
and long-term economic growth. 
 
1.1. Research question and method 
 
Knowledge spillovers are inescapable for any firm engaging in R&D activities which means 
that firms must take them into account in their decisions as profit-maximizing actors. In this 
thesis, I examine how spillovers affect the equilibrium amounts of R&D. It is in specific interest 
to examine the theories behind the evolution of R&D levels when firms engage in cooperation 
in research joint ventures. Since the private incentives of R&D work are recognized biased 
from the socially optimal ones, I compare those two and explain the differences. I also broaden 
my analysis to cover different aspects of spillovers and R&D cooperation to gain a more 
comprehensive picture of the performance of research joint ventures in boosting R&D. Lastly, 
I compare R&D cooperation with other public policies, such as subsidies and intellectual 
property rights, to see how research joint ventures perform relatively better. 
 
This thesis is a literature review on the famous d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model and other 
supporting theories examining spillovers and the performance of R&D cooperation in their 
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presence. The literature on this topic is very diverse and applies very different approaches 
which is why it might be difficult to combine the multiple theories and draw conclusions. 
Therefore, the main input of this thesis is to clarify the main theory findings and provide clear 
explanations for the interaction of spillovers and R&D cooperation. I take advantage of the 
multiple features provided by different studies to present a diverse analysis of how this 
interaction adjusts in different situations. 
 
1.2. Previous research  
 
The model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) is groundbreaking in the sense that it 
initiated a great amount of studies and theoretical models of R&D cooperation. Many authors 
develop the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin -model further by adding features for more elaborate 
analysis. Suzumura (1992) engages in more extended welfare analysis whereas Vonotras 
(1994) adds features for different research types and venture structures. Cooperative 
agreements can allow different degrees of competition and coordination in both research and 
production and the welfare effects of different arrangements are presented by Kamien, et al. 
(1992). Beath, et al. (1998) focus on the information sharing in research joint ventures and 
Choi (1993) connects R&D cooperation to product market competition. In addition, Jacquemin 
(1988) uses the model’s results to offer various additional aspects for cost-benefit analysis and 
policy decisions regarding R&D cooperation.  
 
A wide range of economic literature focuses on R&D competition and performance already 
before the publication of d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model which presents a strategic 
commitment game. Katz (1986) uses a four-stage model to study the social benefits of R&D 
cooperation relative to the degree of product market competition as well as the feasible cost 
and research output sharing. Patent race models are an alternative way of measuring the effects 
of research cooperation. For example, Grossman and Shapiro (1987) use a patent race to model 
how firms compete and cooperate in R&D. Spence (1984) builds his own model to examine 
the performance of R&D work in reducing costs and focuses on the importance of efficient 
sharing of knowledge. 
 
The studies presented above build their analysis around a specific model. Wider perspectives 
are provided for example by Katz and Ordover (1990) who gather different aspects R&D 
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cooperation, compare it to other R&D policies and finally apply the theories to real-life cases 
of research join ventures. As for De Bondt (1996), various types of theoretical models are 
analyzed and special attention is paid to the relevant characteristics of knowledge spillovers. 
In addition to all the presented studies, there exists an endless number of other studies with 
slightly different aspects. I have chosen the studies to this thesis based on their coherence with 
my research question which may have required excluding some important studies. I present my 
suggestions for future research from these other studies in the conclusions. 
 
1.3. Structure 
 
The thesis continues as follows: The next section briefly clarifies the key terms used in the 
review. The section III presents the key model of this thesis, analyses its results by applying 
various economic theories and presents a critical assessment of the model’s interpretation of 
knowledge spillovers and R&D cooperation modeling. In the section IV, I aim to explain what 
are the advantages and disadvantages of R&D cooperation as a policy measure and how it 
performs relative to other R&D policies. Finally, the section V puts all pieces together. 
 
2. KEY TERMS 
 
The economic literature studying knowledge spillovers and R&D activities uses slightly 
different terms to describe these phenomena. Therefore, it is crucial to describe in detail the 
terms used in this thesis. Here the essential terms are combined from several studies and the 
goal is to generalize the theories under clear definitions.  
 
2.1. Knowledge spillovers and appropriability problem 
 
Knowledge spillovers mean that part of the technological information produced by one firm’s 
R&D activities transfers to other firms, either as an involuntary leakage or a voluntary 
exchange (De Bondt, 1996). The information can transfer via various channels such as patens 
disclosures, publications, conversations between employees of different firms or hiring of 
employees of the innovator (Mansfield, 1985). In this one-way transfer, the information moves 
between these firms without any payment made in exchange (d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 
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1988).  
 
Knowledge spillovers are a crucial issue in R&D activities because they inflict the 
appropriability problem for individual firms, meaning that the firms cannot restrict the benefits 
of research spilling over to competing firms (Choi, 1993). This problem inflicts the decrease 
of individual firms’ incentives to conduct research and most importantly, distorts them from 
the social incentives (Suzumura, 1992). In addition to knowledge spillovers, unbeneficial 
government policies and loose property rights are examples of other sources of divergence 
between private and social incentives (Katz & Ordover, 1990). However, my analysis focuses 
solely on the phenomenon of knowledge spillovers. 
 
In total, technological knowledge includes incomplete and poorly defined know-how that is 
hard to utilize (Vonotras, 1994). Therefore, an important detail is that knowledge spillovers 
particularly cover the useful part of the technological information. As R&D activities are meant 
to enhance efficiency and thus reduce costs, the knowledge spillovers benefit the receiving 
firms as well through cost reductions. (De Bondt, 1996). Consequently, spillovers are usually 
symbolized by a coefficient  in the production cost function. This coefficient is interpreted as 
the proportion of produced knowledge that spills over and gets values from 0 and 1. (see e.g. 
d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988). The presentation of d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model in 
section 3 explains in detail how spillovers are included in the decision formulations. 
 
2.2. Research joint ventures 
 
The economic literature uses a variety of terms, such as R&D cooperation or ex ante R&D 
cooperation, when modeling the research joint ventures. Throughout this thesis, I use the term 
R&D cooperation for the theoretical modeling and for referring to the policy measure. The 
term research joint venture is used for referring to the entity of cooperating firms as well as the 
broad term of the examined phenomenon. Cooperative efforts and levels are the inputs and 
outputs that research joint ventures produce. 
 
R&D cooperation in research joint ventures are one form of public policy for enhancing 
innovation activities (Katz & Ordover, 1990). The cooperative models of research joint 
ventures vary from developing certain technology or product together to multi-member 
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ventures conducting general research that benefits equally all participant firms (Vonotras, 
1994). However, the fundamental social objective is always the same: enhance productivity in 
research by sharing information and coordinating research paths (Beath, et al., 1998). For 
individual firms, research joint ventures mean sharing costs and increasing efficiency in R&D 
work (Katz, 1986). The cooperation also allows attaining synergy benefits, maintaining 
continuity in research and pooling risks related to R&D work (Douglas, 1990). The 
organizational mechanisms and the characteristics of cooperating firms arguably affects how 
effectively a research joint venture operates and how strong benefits are obtained (Katz & 
Ordover, 1990).  
 
R&D cooperation setting in this thesis is applied from the model of d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) where two firms share basic information and efforts in the R&D phase before 
product-market competition. The model doesn’t describe any characteristics or cooperative 
mechanisms in detail which makes it a very simplified version of a real-life situation. On one 
hand, this feature makes the model an excellent instrument for explaining how R&D 
cooperation and spillover effects work but on the other hand, it brings on the need for careful 
analysis outside the model. I explain the central deficiencies of the model in section 3.4. and 
engage in deeper analysis in section 4. 
 
3. D’ASPREMONT-JACQUEMIN MODEL 
 
The famous model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin forms the theoretical background of this 
thesis. In this section, I explain the mathematical logic behind the model and the computation 
of the different equilibrium levels of R&D. The last two parts engage in analyzing the results 
based on other economic studies and the deficiencies of the simplified model. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) represent a two-stage duopoly strategy game where the 
firms choose levels of R&D in the first precompetitive stage and levels of production in the 
second competitive stage. Throughout the model, the firm’s own decisions are marked with 
index 𝑖 whereas the other firm’s decisions with index 𝑗. There are two firms in a duopoly which 
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means that 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
 
The model analyzes three levels of cooperative effort: no cooperation, cooperation in R&D and 
complete two-stage cooperation in both R&D and production. The last setting is left out of the 
analysis as the focus in this thesis is only on the linkage between spillovers and R&D work. 
When firms cooperate in research in the first stage, they engage in joint profit maximization 
and are symmetric, i.e. invest same amounts to R&D.  
 
The authors model the first-stage profit functions for the two competing companies, which they 
can then use to define the equilibrium for each level of R&D cooperation. To get to the first-
stage profit function, the second-stage profit function and the consequent equilibrium output is 
needed. They start by defining the linear inverse demand function 𝐷−1 as well as the linear 
cost function 𝐶𝑖. The cost function takes into account the current technology level 𝐴, firm’s 
own investment level 𝑥𝑖 and the other firm’s investment 𝑥𝑗 multiplied by spillover rate . Both 
investment levels are negative factors due to their cost reducing character. The functions are 
defined as follows: 
 
𝐷−1 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄  
𝐶𝑖 = (𝐴 − 𝑥𝑖 −  𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖. 
 
In the second-stage product-market competition, the profit function of firm 𝑖 embodies the total 
income element 𝐷−1𝑄, the total production costs 𝐶𝑖 and the cost of installing the current 
investment level 𝑥𝑖, defined by 𝛾
𝑥𝑖
2
2
 (Henriques, 1990). As assumed along this thesis, the 
spillover rate 𝛽 affects the profits through the production costs. The second-stage profit 
function can thus be written as: 
 
𝜋𝑖 = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄)𝑞𝑖 − (𝐴 − 𝑥𝑖 −  𝑥𝑗)𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾
𝑥𝑖
2
2
. 
 
The model represents functional forms for non-cooperative, cooperative and socially efficient 
levels of R&D that are deduced from first-stage profit functions of each setting. In addition to 
profit maximization behavior, the model assumes that the equilibrium production level 𝑞𝑖 
chosen by firms in the second stage is a unique and efficient Cournot-Nash equilibrium. When 
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the function of 𝑞𝑖 is introduced in either the individual firm’s second-stage profit function 𝜋𝑖  
defined above, the resulting function represents the first-stage profit-maximization problem 𝜋𝑖
∗ 
as a function of own investment 𝑥𝑖 and the other firm’s investment 𝑥𝑗.  
 
Solving this problem for firm 𝑖, the efficient level of R&D is obtained. The amount is a unique 
equilibrium result satisfying 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 0, meaning that it is obtained when profits are maximized. 
The functional forms for each setting computed by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) are 
introduced separately in the following section.  
 
3.2. Different levels of R&D 
 
3.2.1. Non-cooperative 
 
In the first-stage of the non-cooperative setting, the duopoly firms maximize their individual 
profits. The profit of firm 𝑖 in the first-stage is written as: 
 
𝜋𝑖
∗ =
1
9𝑏
[(𝑎 − 𝐴) + (2 −  )𝑥𝑖 + (2 − 1)𝑥𝑗]
2
− 𝛾
𝑥𝑖
2
2
. 
 
Consequently, the equilibrium result for 𝑥𝑖 obtained from 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 0 is 
 
𝑥𝑖
∗ =
(𝑎 − 𝐴)(2 − )
4.5𝑏𝛾 − (2 − )(1 + )
. 
 
3.2.2. Cooperative 
 
In the cooperative setting, the duopoly firms agree on a symmetric R&D investment 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 =
𝑥 and engage in joint profit maximization in the first stage. The joint profits are calculated 
simply as (see the complete function in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, p. 1135)) 
 
?̂? = 𝜋1
∗ + 𝜋2
∗ 
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and the equilibrium cooperative R&D level solving 
𝜕?̂?
𝜕?̂?
= 0 is  
 
𝑥 =
(𝑎 − 𝐴)(1 + )
4.5𝑏𝛾 − (1 + )2
. 
 
When comparing the formulation of the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium amounts, 
the crucial factors are (2 − ) and (1 + ). These factors are the only channels through which 
spillover rate  affects the equilibrium amounts. The fact that (2 − ) > (1 + ) when 𝛽 < 0.5 
and (2 − ) < (1 + ) when 𝛽 > 0.5 explains the order of magnitude between 𝑥∗ and 𝑥 with 
small and large spillovers.  
 
3.2.3. Social optimum 
 
The social welfare function in the model offers an efficiency standard to analyze the results of 
the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. The social welfare function 𝑊 of consumption 
𝑄 is naturally the sum of the consumer surplus 𝑉(𝑄) and the producer surplus obtained as the 
sum of the production costs 𝐶 and the cost of installing the investment level 𝛾𝑥2: 
 
𝑊(𝑄) =  𝑉(𝑄) − 𝐴𝑄 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑥𝑄 − 𝛾𝑥2. 
 
Computing the welfare maximizing level of 𝑄 resolving 
𝜕𝑊(𝑄)
𝜕Q
= 0 in the second stage, and 
placing it to the first-stage social welfare function 𝑊∗∗(𝑄) =  𝑊(𝑄), the model obtains the 
socially efficient level of R&D satisfying  
𝜕𝑊∗∗
𝜕x
= 0: 
 
𝑥∗∗ =
(𝑎 − 𝐴)(1 + )
2𝑏𝛾 − (1 + )2
. 
 
The only factors that distinguishes the formulation of the social optimum amount from the 
cooperative one is the numeral coefficient before 𝑏𝛾. The fact that 4.5 > 2 ensures that 𝑥∗∗ is 
always higher than ?̂?. The formulations of social optimum and non-cooperative amounts differ 
also regarding the appearance of either the factor (1 + ) or (2 − ) in the numerator and the 
denominator. However, 4.5 as a coefficient of 𝑏𝛾 ensures that 𝑥∗ is always smaller than 𝑥∗∗. 
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The model can be criticized for forcing optimal prices to equal marginal costs in the market 
which naturally affects the resulting R&D level in the social optimum. The applicability of this 
optimum can be questioned because attaining that level would need intervention by 
government which doesn’t agree with democratic governance. (Suzumura, 1992). Suzumura 
(1992) introduces a feasible second-best optimum to escape this problem, but the results are 
not different from the ones introduced in the next section. Therefore, I assume that the 
applicability of the social optimum doesn’t affect the relevant conclusions of this thesis. 
 
3.2.4. Summary 
 
Comparing the results in section 3.2.1.-3.2.3, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) obtain 
the following classification: When spillovers are large (𝛽 > 0.5), 
 
𝑥∗∗ > 𝑥 > 𝑥∗ 
 
and when spillovers are small (𝛽  0.4), 
 
𝑥∗∗ > 𝑥∗>  𝑥. 
 
The results show that when spillovers are small, the non-cooperative R&D level is higher than 
the cooperative one. On the contrary, the cooperative R&D level exceeds the non-cooperative 
one when spillovers are large. Even though this model is a very simplified description of the 
real world, these results illustrate the effects that cooperation has on R&D activities. In the next 
section, I provide explanations for these results based on the theories presented in the economic 
literature. 
 
3.3. Analyzing the results 
 
The starting point in the analysis of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) is that R&D 
cooperation reduce R&D levels because firms share their research results and can eliminate 
useless duplicative efforts in their research agendas. However, they ignore the fact that 
cooperation has incentive enhancing effects as well that increase R&D levels (Jacquemin, 
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1988). A central issue regarding spillovers is that the competitors can use the R&D information 
without paying for it which limits the competitive advantage of the innovator (De Bondt, 1996). 
This inability to fully appropriate the gains from individual R&D work lowers private incentive 
to conduct research (Suzumura, 1992).  Cooperation helps to internalize the knowledge 
spillovers and their positive externality effects, which serves as a mechanism to restore 
incentives (Katz, 1986). The relative magnitude of these opposite effects depends on the 
magnitude of spillovers. 
 
When spillovers are small, the results of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) indicate that non-
cooperative level of R&D is superior to the cooperative one. The lower level of cooperative 
R&D is partly explained by the reduced duplication of research efforts (Katz, 1986). In this 
case, the appropriability problem of knowledge production is alleviated because rivals gain 
smaller cost reducing benefits due to lower spillover rates (Suzumura, 1992). Consequently, 
the competitive advantage of individual R&D work and hereby the individual R&D levels 
aren’t skewed downwards (De Bondt, 1996). In addition, individual firms may put socially 
excessive efforts to R&D simply to gain advantage over the competitors by investing more 
(Brander & Spencer, 1983). These theories support the model’s results for small spillovers. 
 
On the contrary, large spillovers magnify the appropriability problem related to R&D work as 
more technological information spills overs to other firms (De Bondt, 1996). Therefore, the 
individual R&D incentives are reduced significantly and cooperation plays an important role 
in restoring incentives by internalizing the benefits of knowledge spillovers (Suzumura, 1992). 
Cooperation also allows increasing efficiency in research through cost-sharing which further 
increases the incentives (Katz, 1986). These theories support the results of d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) which indicate that cooperative R&D levels exceed the non-cooperative 
ones when spillovers are large. 
 
In the socially optimal situation, the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model maximizes the total 
welfare as a function of the consumer and producer surpluses. This definition already separates 
the socially efficient R&D level from the private levels that are defined by firms’ profit-
maximization. Private profit-maximization means that private firms ignore the welfare effects 
of their actions on other actors (Katz & Ordover, 1990). These welfare effects arise because 
new knowledge can benefit other firms by increasing the profits through the cost-savings that 
it enables (De Bondt, 1996). As the cost-savings increase the producer surplus, new R&D 
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information allows increasing the total surplus and welfare in the economy (Katz, 1986). 
Therefore, private firms ignoring these positive welfare externalities conduct too little research 
from the social standpoint (Katz & Ordover, 1990). These theories support the model’s results 
indicating that the socially efficient level of R&D always exceeds the private levels. 
 
As a conclusion, the results show that the effect of reduced duplication dominates the incentive 
effects when spillovers are small and therefore the cooperative R&D levels remain small. On 
the contrary, large spillovers emphasize the incentive effects increasing the cooperative R&D 
levels compared to the individual ones and the reduced duplication is compensated. However, 
neither the cooperative nor the non-cooperative R&D amount exceeds the social optimum at 
any level of spillovers. 
 
3.4. Analyzing the model 
 
It is important to remember that the d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model is a very simplified 
presentation of the research joint ventures and therefore, it might fail to fully demonstrate all 
properties of cooperation. In this section, I extend my analysis of the model by including 
important features related to the spillovers and modeling R&D cooperation. The idea is to 
provide a more comprehensive examination of the effects of cooperation and describe both 
situations where the beneficial effects are emphasized and reasons why cooperation might in 
fact be unfavorable. 
 
3.4.1. Interpretation of knowledge spillovers 
 
The economic literature studying knowledge spillovers has identified several characteristics 
that complicate the modeling of R&D activities. Knowledge in general is a combination of 
poorly-defined know-how and highly-codified information which makes it hard to utilize 
knowledge effectively (Vonotras, 1994). Hereby, the first important feature of knowledge 
spillovers is that they particularly cover the useful part of the technological knowledge 
produced by R&D work. The magnitude of these useful elements depends on the similarities 
in firms’ existing technologies. Therefore, the ability to take advantage of the new information 
varies significantly across different firms. (De Bondt, 1996). In addition, individual R&D work 
affects the firm’s abilities to identify and exploit the knowledge that spills over from the 
 13 
surrounding firms (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model presents 
spillovers simply by some rate 𝛽 which leaves it for additional analysis to take account of 
possible asymmetries that affect the real magnitude of spillovers.  
 
Second important aspect is that d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model allows analyzing cooperation 
only in generic research. This may create problems for more general analysis since competition 
in R&D activities occurs in both generic and development research. Similarly, firms can choose 
to cooperate in either of these research types. (Grossman & Shapiro, 1987). In truth, most firms 
conduct both types of research individually or cooperatively in different joint ventures at the 
same time.  Among these two types, the development research is more firm-specific and 
therefore harder to share, whereas the generic research produces knowledge that is applicable 
in a wider range of firms. (Vonotras, 1994). The between-member spillovers in research joint 
ventures are thus at their largest in generic research (Katz, 1986).  
 
A final important feature recognized in economic literature is the product market competition 
between cooperating firms that is measured by the degree of product differentiation. Lower 
differentiation prevents the competitive advantage gained by R&D work because rivals use 
more similar technologies and can benefit better from the cost-reducing knowledge. This 
means that the negative incentive effect in individual R&D work and the role of cooperation 
in fixing the incentives is magnified. (De Bondt, et al., 1992). However, more intense 
competition in the product market can lower the cooperative levels of R&D because an 
increasing part of their benefits accrue to consumers through lower competitive market prices 
(Katz, 1986). Since d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model employs a Cournot competition situation 
with only two duopoly firms, the results might be less attractive when the competitive situation 
is intensified (Vonotras, 1994). 
 
In conclusion, the economic literature has given great attention to the complicated nature of 
knowledge spillovers. Therefore, it might be dangerous to simplify their nature in theoretical 
models to one single rate 𝛽 like d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) do.  Asymmetries, nature 
of research and product market competition all affect the actual rate of spillovers and 
consequently the corresponding externalities. These main determinants of the welfare effects 
must be considered when applying the model to specific situations and policy decisions 
(d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1990).  
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3.4.2. Modeling R&D cooperation 
 
The cooperative setting in d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model is very simplified which might 
lower its accuracy in demonstrating the real-life situations. The most significant deficiency is 
that the model considers spillovers as exogenous variables in the cost function that are the same 
in non-cooperative and cooperative settings. Hereby, it fails to embody many synergy effects 
of cooperation. (d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1990). In addition, there exists other benefits and 
costs of cooperation that must be considered outside theoretical modeling. These are covered 
in the section 4. 
 
First, cooperating firms have common processes of transforming R&D investments into 
knowledge which means that they share information more comprehensively (Beath, et al., 
1998). Most importantly, R&D cooperation eliminates the problems of asymmetric 
information that are a central issue in the competitive market transactions of technological 
knowledge. Since valuating the purchased information accurately is hard for the buyer, the 
dissemination of knowledge is often insufficient without cooperative sharing. (Katz, 1986). 
Depending on the organizational arrangement affecting the perfection of communication and 
the utilization of information, the spillovers rates in research joint ventures can become 
complete (d’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1990). On the contrary, they remain only partial outside 
the ventures (Bernstein & Nadiri, 1989). More comprehensive information sharing is reached 
for example when firms conduct R&D collectively in shared facilities rather than each firm 
individually (Vonotras, 1994). This allows cooperating firms to obtain a certain level of cost 
reductions with fewer resources compared to no cooperation (Kamien, et al., 1992).  
 
Second, R&D cooperation in research joint ventures allows firms to pool not only their research 
results but also research teams, technology and know-how which enhances their cost-reducing 
technologies (Suzumura, 1992). Therefore, cooperation allows higher cost reductions than non-
cooperative activities (Poyako-Theotoky, 1999). In conclusion, d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –
model fails to bring out the complete benefits of R&D cooperation by not allowing spillovers 
to increase when the firms cooperate. A model with endogenous spillovers would allow 
intensifying the cost-reducing benefits of R&D cooperation.  
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4. COMPARING R&D COOPERATION TO OTHER R&D POLICIES 
 
The economic literature identifies three main policy measure to address the socially too low 
R&D incentives. In addition to R&D cooperation, there exists also tax policies and subsidies 
as well as ex post cooperation with intellectual property rights. In this section, I aim to give 
both additional aspects of the benefits and flaws of R&D cooperation as a policy measure and 
more perspective by comparing it to the alternative policies. However, my goal is not to make 
definitive conclusions about which policy is preferable and deeper comparative analysis needs 
to be conducted separately. 
 
4.1. Opportunities and challenges of R&D cooperation 
 
In addition to enabling larger cost reduction with fewer resources, R&D cooperation allows 
maintaining continuity as well as spreading and pooling risks (Douglas, 1990). Creating new 
technologies is a long-term project and require prolonged commitment and interaction between 
partners. In the long run, the speed of invention must be increasing to gain first-mover 
advantage in the market which naturally increases the risks the firms are taking. (Jacquemin, 
1988). Therefore, sharing risks and conducting several less uncorrelated research paths brings 
significant benefits to the members of research joint ventures (Dasgupta & Maskin, 1987).  
Maintaining several independent research paths is crucial since the reduced duplication in R&D 
cooperation might also induce inflexibility and increase the possibility of dead-end research 
paths (Jacquemin, 1988).  
 
An important remark concerning the intensified sharing of resources and information in 
research joint ventures is that the increased sharing is accompanied by increased competition 
(Choi, 1993). Cooperating firms are forced to endure this direct competition in the product 
market after the research stage (Grossman & Shapiro, 1987). This brings on the issue of partner 
selection and balanced contributions because some partners might be remarkably strengthened 
by the cooperation and impose a significantly increased threat on the other partners (Jacquemin, 
1988). The intensified competition means that the benefits of R&D cooperation disperse 
quickly and the total profits in the industry decrease as market prices go down. Theoretically, 
it’s profitable for firms to form a research joint venture only if the possible gains from 
increasing efficiency are larger than the losses due to intensified competition. (Choi, 1993). 
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In this thesis, I examine the potential beneficial effects of R&D cooperation, but it would be 
misleading to think that cooperation is favorable whenever it induces more or more efficient 
R&D. To examine the overall welfare gains that research joint ventures enable, focusing on 
only equilibrium amounts of R&D is not enough. (Katz & Ordover, 1990). One aspect of 
research joint ventures is that it allows firms to get together and collude in the product market 
(Vonotras, 1994). This can bring on monopoly power and reduced competitive pressure to 
cooperating firms, causing them to reduce outputs in the product market. The fact that reduced 
output reduces the overall welfare in the economy would make the R&D cooperation an 
ineffective way to increase the R&D incentives. (Katz, 1986). Consequently, many authors 
conclude that the cooperative agreements should be allowed only for coordinating research 
activities and not cooperating in the production output (see e.g. Kamien, et al., 1992). 
 
In addition to comparing non-cooperative and cooperative R&D efforts to the socially optimal 
ones, it is relevant to examine whether allowing firms to form research joint ventures in the 
first place is optimal from the social standpoint (Kamien, et al., 1992). Another aspect is the 
problem of stability in especially the cross-country cooperative agreements regarding for 
example diverse domestic regulations and the clash of corporate cultures (Jacquemin, 1988). 
However, these questions of optimality and feasibility are outside the focus area of this thesis 
and they must be analyzed separately. 
 
4.2. Comparison to tax policies and subsidies 
 
Tax policies as well as indirect and direct subsidies are government interventions used to 
increase R&D incentives (Katz & Ordover, 1990). However, the economic literature has 
highlighted several shortcomings that tax and subsidy policies possess compared to R&D 
cooperation that doesn’t include government intervention. First, these policies fail to fix the 
problem of insufficient sharing of the R&D results. Therefore, taxes and subsidies are 
inefficient R&D enhancing policies especially when spillovers are weak but can work better 
with higher spillovers. (Spence, 1984). On the contrary, increased sharing of R&D results is 
one of the central benefits of R&D cooperation that is reached both with high and low spillovers 
(Katz, 1986).  
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Another shortcoming is that even if taxes and subsidies managed to raise R&D incentives, the 
resulting levels might in fact be distorted from the social optimum rather than corrected towards 
it (Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 1980). This raises the same problem of socially excessive R&D 
investments that explains why non-cooperative R&D levels in d’Aspremont-Jacquemin model 
exceed cooperative ones when spillovers are small. As discussed in section 3.3, socially 
excessive efforts are possible because competing firms might try to gain advantage over each 
other by investing more (Brander & Spencer, 1983). These excessive efforts are eliminated 
when firms cooperate in R&D since they coordinate the research agendas, reduce the 
duplication of efforts and have no need to compete in R&D (d'Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988).  
 
Tax and subsidy policies might generate moral hazard by giving firms incentives to engage in 
specious research project simply to accumulate subsidies (Katz & Ordover, 1990). The R&D 
cooperation evokes no moral hazard but cooperating firms might restrict R&D and output 
levels together due to the increased collective competitive force (Vonotras, 1994). It is hard to 
conclude which of these distortions is less harmful but at least the government must gather the 
funds for the subsidies somewhere and less public monetary support is disposable for other 
purposes. Indeed, collecting the revenues to pay the subsidies under different tax policies 
means transferring resources from one sector to another which creates deadweight losses. 
(Katz, 1986). These losses give rise to the criticism against subsidies based on government’s 
right or ability to pick up the benefiters that gain the subsidies and the losers that are forced to 
fund them (Katz & Ordover, 1990).  
 
4.3. Comparison to ex post cooperation 
 
Like the R&D cooperation, the ex post cooperation is a way of fixing R&D incentives through 
the market forces with no government intervention which separates it from tax and subsidy 
policies. Supporting the ex post cooperation is possible for example by strengthening the 
intellectual property rights such as patents and licenses, or allowing more leeway for firms 
concerning the ex post cooperation arrangements. (Katz & Ordover, 1990).  
 
Strong protection through the intellectual property right allows firms to limit the free flow of 
information to the potential buyers of rights hereby allowing increased revenues. This helps to 
fix the appropriability problem of R&D investments that individual firms face and increase 
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their incentives to conduct research. (Katz & Ordover, 1990). However, some authors argue 
that the efficacy of intellectual property rights depends greatly on the industry and the nature 
of technology it uses. Therefore, they may fail to entirely stop the knowledge from spilling 
over to the competitors. (see e.g. Jaffe, 1986). Research joint ventures can gather the 
beneficiaries of a new technology together to share the costs and benefits and alleviate this 
problem of free-riders. Nevertheless, the research joint ventures may fail to fix the entire 
problem as some firms may still decide to stay outside the venture to avoid the costs and instead 
take advantage of the knowledge produced by others. (Choi, 1993). 
 
The intellectual property rights limiting the knowledge spillovers can be criticized because the 
spillovers force firms to share their R&D results and enable the socially sufficient sharing of 
successful innovations (Spence, 1984). In addition, the policies of stronger intellectual property 
rights may increase incentives to innovate in the first generation but may fail to motivate the 
follow-on innovations in the subsequent generations (Green & Scotchmer, 1990). Therefore, 
these policies limiting spillovers may decrease the aggregate productivity and the 
competitiveness of the local economy in the long term (Katz & Ordover, 1990).  
 
Most importantly, intellectual property rights increase the knowledge dissemination prices over 
the marginal cost whereas the spillovers disseminate knowledge at the socially optimal level 
(Katz & Ordover, 1990). This means that even though the dissemination of R&D results 
continues, the intellectual property rights decrease the efficient sharing among firms (Spence, 
1984). Research joint ventures allow not only costless sharing of R&D results among 
cooperating firms, but also long-term planning and commitment in research that offer crucial 
support for the economic growth (Jacquemin, 1988). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
R&D cooperation in the research joint ventures has two important impacts on research. First, 
the cooperative efforts increase efficiency by eliminating the excessive duplication in firms’ 
research agendas. Second, the cooperation increases the research incentives and amounts by 
internalizing the spillover benefits. The research joint ventures play an important role in 
increasing the R&D levels especially in industries with high spillover rates. The spillover rates 
are high when the product market competition is intense and the research on generic 
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technologies is important. In these industries, the individual incentives are biased from the 
social ones due to the low appropriability of the cost-reducing benefits. To best attain these 
beneficial effects, the existing technologies of cooperating firms need to be similar enough and 
the research must be generic enough to ensure applicability to all member firms. However, the 
R&D cooperation never attains the socially optimal level of R&D. 
 
In addition, the research joint ventures generally enable more cost reductions with less 
resources due to the synergy benefits attained by increased information sharing and pooling all 
research resources. These synergies further intensify the benefits of R&D cooperation. Lastly, 
research joint ventures allow maintaining crucial continuity in research and pooling risks 
regarding new inventions and possible dead-end research paths. All these additional benefits 
are crucial regarding the individual firms’ decisions of joining a research joint venture. Closer 
cooperation intensifies the competition among the cooperating firms and the overall gains from 
cooperation need to be more significant than the potential losses from the intensified 
competition. 
 
All the R&D policies can succeed in fixing R&D incentives but the most important feature 
differentiating R&D cooperation from other policies is the additional improvements it offers 
for boosting R&D. The taxes and subsidies don’t increase the incentives to share information 
and the intellectual property rights either limit the dissemination of knowledge or do it at 
socially excessive prices. Both policies may fail to promote continuity in innovation generation 
after generation. In addition, the subsidies are unfavorable due to the socially excessive 
investments, the moral hazard and the deadweight losses they promote. Therefore, the research 
joint ventures should be embraced for their ability to not only boost efficient sharing but also 
maintain continuity which ensures a continued increase of competitiveness. 
 
In conclusion, my analysis shows that the research joint ventures perform well in boosting 
especially more effective innovation activities. Even though research joint ventures might 
conduct less research than individual firms in some situations, they bring about additional 
benefits that are crucial in promoting more productive research activities. Achieving these 
benefits is possible especially because of the carefully designed knowledge sharing structures. 
The support for long-term endeavors and risk-taking in creating new technologies makes the 
research joint ventures especially important in the central growth-boosting industries. Naturally 
the research joint ventures have potential threats as well, the most important one being the risks 
 20 
of collusion and increased monopoly power among the cooperating firms.  
 
The most important potential deficiency of my analysis is the simplified nature of 
d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model. The model results might be exaggerated due to the 
examining only the basic research and allowing a limited intensity of competition among the 
cooperating firms. The theoretical models arguably become the more complex the closer they 
are to the real-life situations. However, I purposely chose a simple model to explain the effects 
of R&D cooperation through cost sharing as clearly as possible and I aim to ensure the 
applicability to the real-life by careful analysis supporting the model.  
 
An aspect that my analysis doesn’t cover is the best organizational structure for magnifying 
the benefits of research joint ventures. However, this subject is covered more in the literature 
of industrial organization and hereby is outside my focus on theoretical modeling of the 
incentive and other beneficial effects of the R&D cooperation. My comparative analysis of the 
other policy measures is also rather lightweight. Therefore, a great possibility for the future 
reviews is to carefully compare the policies’ ability to boost effective innovative activities in 
different situations. In addition, my review covers the studies made close to the publication of 
d’Aspremont-Jacquemin –model. These studies offer great opportunities to develop the 
model’s analysis further but more recent studies could offer different aspects and a closer 
relation to the current policies and research joint ventures. 
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